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Note
Is "Big Brother" Listening? A Critical Analysis of New
Rules Permitting Law Enforcement Agencies To Use
Dialed Digit Extraction
Michael A. Rosow*
Imagine working for a large company under investigation
for serious criminal activity. The Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) has convinced a judge to issue a warrant allowing
agents to see the phone numbers of every individual who re-
ceives a phone call from your office or any mobile phone billed
to your office, but has refused to issue a warrant allowing the
FBI to listen to those conversations. While driving home from
work, you make a call from your company mobile phone to the
local pharmacy and reach an automated system. When the
computer-generated voice asks for your prescription number,
you dial in your prescription for AZT, the HIV cocktail medica-
tion. You stop at the pharmacy and pick up your prescription
half an hour later. The following week you are approached by a
FBI agent who demands that you provide inside information for
the investigation. When you refuse to provide this information,
the agent threatens to tell your parents, your boss, and your
pastor that you have HIV. Although this scenario may seem
far-fetched, new rules issued by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) on August 31, 1999 would enable the FBI to
do this very thing.
The device used by law enforcement agencies to obtain the
numbers dialed from a telephone is a pen register.1 Currently
a pen register can only intercept the first set of numbers dialed
from a telephone. Under the new rules, which become effective
on September 30, 2001,2 law enforcement agencies will have ac-
* J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1998,
University of Redlands. The author would like to thank his mom, dad, little
sister, and Mona for their support and encouragement.
1. See infra Part L.A for an in-depth description of pen registers.
2. Several parties have challenged the new rules in the U.S. Court of
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cess to digits dialed after the telephone call has been connected
(dialed digit extraction).3 This new development raises serious
issues regarding the constitutionality of these rules and the
FCC's authority to enact them. Privacy groups and the tele-
communications industry argue that the rules substantially in-
crease the type and amount of information available via a pen
register. Law enforcement agencies, on the other hand, argue
that this capability merely allows them to keep pace with
changing technology.
This Note will examine the statutory validity and constitu-
tionality of the new rules authorizing the use of dialed digit ex-
traction by law enforcement. Part I describes the technology at
issue, the statutory framework under which the rules were is-
sued, and the constitutional framework under which the rules
should be analyzed. In Part II, this Note argues that the FCC
exceeded its authority in issuing these rules and that the rules
are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. This Note
concludes by suggesting alternatives that may resolve the is-
sues more suitably while still providing necessary information
to law enforcement agencies.
I. TECHNICAL, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF A PEN REGISTER
A. TECHNICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A WIRETAP AND A PEN
REGISTER
Although three types of electronic surveillance devices are
available: wiretaps, pen registers, and trap and trace devices,
4
this Part will only examine the differences between wiretaps
and pen registers. The difference between these two devices is
initially important for practical reasons; there is a radical dif-
ference between the type and amount of information obtained
Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Motion for Expedition, United States
Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, (D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1442); Motion to Consolidate
and to Expedite Review, Cellular Telecomm. Indus. Ass'n, v. FCC, (D.C. Cir.
1999) (No. 99-1475).
3. See Third Report and Order app. A § 22.1103 (No. 97-213) (Aug. 31,
1999) [hereinafter Third Report].
4. This Note avoids extensive discussion of trap and trace devices, but
due to their similarity with pen registers, they will be discussed tangentially.
A trap and trace device works like a caller ID box installed by a third party.
The device "captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify
the originating number" from which a telephone call was made. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3127(4) (1994).
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from a wiretap as opposed to a pen register.5 Due to this differ-
ence, wiretaps and pen registers are subject to different stan-
dards.6
Government-conducted wiretaps are governed primarily by
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.7 A Title III wiretap allows law enforcement agencies to
listen to the "content" of telephone conversations.8 The criteria
used to determine what exactly constitutes "content" is central
to the distinction between Title III wiretaps and pen registers 9
and will be discussed in detail later in this Note.' 0 For now, it
is sufficient to note that conversations between two different
parties constitute call "content," while the numbers dialed to
connect a call do not."I In contrast to a wiretap, a pen register
does not obtain call "content," but only records the phone num-
ber of the called party.12 A wiretap also obtains the numbers
dialed on a telephone, but accomplishes this task in a different
manner.
13
5. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1977).
6. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), with New
York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 168-69 (distinguishing wiretaps and pen registers).
7. See United States v. Kail, 612 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1979).
8. See New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 166.
9. Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding
that since a pen register did not obtain the "content" of a telephone call it was
not a "search and seizure" under the Fourth Amendment), and New York Tel.
Co., 434 U.S. at 167 (holding that a pen register did not intercept because it
did not obtain call "content"), with Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (holding that listen-
ing to the telephone call of an individual constitutes a "search and seizure"
under the Fourth Amendment), and Kail, 612 F.2d at 447 (holding that once a
valid wiretap order has been issued law enforcement agencies do not need to
obtain additional authorization to use a pen register).
10. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
11. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741. "Content" is defined as including "any in-
formation concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of communication."
18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1994).
12. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1 (citing New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at
161 n.1); see also Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 386
(6th Cir. 1977) ("[A] pen register only records the telephone numbers dialed by
a monitored telephone."). A pen register performs a very limited function. It
does not record or monitor the contents of a call and does not indicate whether
or not the call was completed. See id. at 386 n.1 (citing United States v. Gior-
dano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
13. See Kail, 612 F.2d at 448. Since a Title III wiretap records the electri-
cal impulses that identify numbers dialed on a telephone, it is possible to deci-
pher these numbers without the use of a pen register. See id. The "mechani-
cal refinement provided by the pen register is thus comprehended within the
terms of the wiretap order, making separate authorization unnecessary." Id.
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Pen registers gather different types and amounts of infor-
mation as compared to wiretaps because the current telephone
switching system prevents pen registers from intercepting the
content of telephone communications.' 4 Modern telephone
switching systems have at least two different channels for a
simple telephone communication.' 5 The first channel, the call
data channel, routes the call through to the proper location and
remains operational only until the phone call has been properly
routed, which occurs when it rings on the other end of the
line.' 6 The call is routed at a switch into which tone receivers
are built and when the call is routed over this first channel, the
call goes through the tone receivers.17 The switch employs tone
receivers to detect the dialed digits representing the phone
number. It then connects the call, at which point the call is
"cut through."18 After the communication has been cut through
the tone receiver disconnects from the switch and is available
for use on another call.19 At this point, the conversation is
transferred along the "call content channel."20 There are fewer
tone receivers built into a switch than there are call content
channels. Therefore, a single switch may service more simul-
taneous communications than it has tone receivers because the
majority of the communications going through a switch, at any
given time, have been cut through and are being carried along
the call content channel instead of the call data channel.21
(citation omitted).
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (defining a pen register as "a device which rec-
ords or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed
or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is at-
tached").
15. See Michael W. Mowery, Comments of Airtouch Communications, Inc.
at 18 (No. 97-213) (May 20, 1998) [hereinafter May Airtouch Petition].
16. See Stewart A. Baker, Comments of the Telecomms. Indus. Ass'n at 44
(No. 97-213) (May 20, 1998) [hereinafter May TIA Petition].
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See May Airtouch Petition, supra note 15, at 18.
21. See May TIA Petition, supra note 16, at 44 ("Because tone receivers
can be repeatedly used in this manner, manufacturers build switches with a
number of tone receivers that is far lower than the number of simultaneous
calls that the switch can support.").
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B. AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE LAW ON WIRETAPPING AND
USE OF PEN REGISTERS
In the last half-century there have been three major statu-
tory changes to the laws of wiretapping and pen registers.22
While this Note focuses on the rules enacted subsequent to the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994
(CALEA), it is important to understand the progression of the
law through the latter half of the twentieth century because
CALEA builds upon these other acts.
1. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968
The first statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Street Act of 1968, made it illegal for an individual to
conduct electronic surveillance,23 but made it possible for law
enforcement agencies to obtain judicial authorization to engage
in such surveillance.24 Title III was primarily a response to ad-
vancements in technology.25 Title III had a dual purpose of
protecting telephone communications from unauthorized inter-
ception and delineating the proper circumstances and condi-
tions for conducting telephone surveillance.26
The standards that Title III set for obtaining a wiretap
have remained virtually unchanged in the three decades since
its enactment. In order to issue a warrant, a judge must find
that "there is probable cause [to believe] that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular
offense... [and that] normal investigative procedures have
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely
22. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-415, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010
and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
23. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520 (1994).
24. See id.; see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 27 (No. 97-213)
(Aug. 26, 1999).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 11 (1994) ("'[Tlhe tremendous scientific
and technological developments that have taken place in the last century have
made possible today the widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance
techniques. As a result of these developments, privacy of communications is
seriously jeopardized by these techniques of surveillance.'" (quoting S. REP.
No. 90-1097, at 67 (1968)).
26. See id.
2000] 1055
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to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous."27 However, Title III
did not initially address pen registers or set a standard to issue
a warrant for a pen register.28
Title III was amended slightly in 1970 after the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that telephone companies were not required to assist
law enforcement agencies in effectuating electronic surveil-
lance. 29 This ruling paralyzed law enforcement agencies; they
could obtain a valid warrant for a Title III wiretap, but were
helpless to effectuate it without the assistance of the telecom-
munications companies.30 Without this assistance, law en-
forcement would have to set up their wiretaps in plain view of
the subject of the tap. But in order to be effective, law en-
forcement needed to be able to conduct these taps secretively.31
The amendments required telephone companies to furnish the
law enforcement agency requesting assistance with "all infor-
mation, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accom-
plish the interception."32 This allowed law enforcement agen-
cies to lease lines from the telecommunications companies so
that they could conduct their taps without being observed.33
2. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA) made several relevant changes to Title III. First, it ex-
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). Under Title III law enforcement agencies could
obtain a court order to conduct electronic surveillance upon a showing that in-
cludes the following:
(i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is
about to be committed, (ii)... a particular description of the nature
and location of the facilities from which or the place where the com-
munication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the
type of communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of
the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communica-
tions are to be intercepted.
Id. § 2518(1).
28. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
29. See In re United States for Relief, 427 F.2d 639, 643-44 (9th Cir.
1970). The court refused to extend its authority to order a telephone company
to assist law enforcement agencies. See id. It held that such authority could
not be found in law enforcement's duty to keep the peace nor in the court's
statutory or inherent authority to issue orders. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4).
33. See id.
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tended the protections of Title III to "include electronic mail,
cellular phones, computer transmissions of data or video, and
voice or display paging devices."34 However, Congress some-
what negated the impact of this amendment by not extending
access to these new technologies, which in effect allowed tech-
nology to outpace law enforcement's ability to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance.35 So while these new forms of communica-
tion were protected from being tapped without a warrant, the
statute did nothing to ensure that telecommunications compa-
nies would continue to design their systems in a manner that
facilitated electronic surveillance by law enforcement agencies.
ECPA also added new provisions to the code concerning the
use of pen register devices.3 6 It amended Title III to create the
first mandatory federal procedures for obtaining a pen register
warrant.37 Previously, pen registers were issued under the
court's general power to issue warrants.38 Now, an order for a
pen register may be issued only after a showing that "the in-
formation likely to be obtained by such installation and use is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."39 Conversely, a
Title III wiretap can only be obtained after meeting the much
more stringent "probable cause" standard.40
34. Lillian R. BeVier, The Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994: A Surprising Sequel to the Breakup of AT&T, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1049, 1069 (1999).
35. See Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access to Advanced Tele-
communications Technologies and Services: Joint Hearings on H.R. 4922 and
S. 2375 Before the Subcomm. on Tech. and the Law of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 6 (1994) [hereinafter Hearings] (state-
ment of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (1994).
37. See id.
38. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1977).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2). Note that these requirements are very differ-
ent from the requirements necessary to obtain a wiretap: (a) the identity of the
law enforcement officer making the application; (b) a statement of the facts
and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, including a detailed descrip-
tion of the particular offenses alleged, the location of the intercept, and the
types of communications to be intercepted, and the identity of the persons
whose communications are to be intercepted; (c) an explanation of why other
investigative measures have failed or why they are unlikely to be successful;
(d) a statement of the time for which the interception will be active; (e) a
statement of all previous applications for electronic surveillance of the same
individual; and (f) where the application is for an extension, a statement set-
ting forth the information so far obtained. See id.
40. See id. § 2518(3); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
2000] 1057
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
3. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
of 1994 (CALEA)
a. The Path to CALEA
As the 1980s progressed, the law enforcement community
began to realize that it was losing its ability to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance.41 Technological developments were making
it increasingly difficult for Title III wiretaps and pen registers
to be used effectively. Prior to the breakup of AT&T, the tele-
communications system was quite simple.42 The network con-
sisted mainly of stationary telephones that were connected by
land-based wires to stationary switching stations.43 To install a
Title III wiretap or a pen register, a law enforcement agency
only had to find a location where the wires were exposed and
either: (1) attach a listening/recording device to that location; or
(2) rent another phone line and send the tapped conversation to
a distant location to be listened to and recorded.44
After the breakup of AT&T, however, a massive technologi-
cal revolution occurred in the telecommunications industry.45
Now fiber-optic cables are replacing the old copper cables, and
computers are replacing traditional switches. 46 Mobile phones
are not connected to any fixed location and can roam around
the country sending their signal through different switches
wherever they go.47 In addition, companies are adding new fea-
tures to traditional telephones that allow a single telephone
number to ring in several different places 48 or that allow a user
to dial an abbreviated directory number to call another party.49
41. See U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC SURVEIL-
LANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 2 (1995) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE].
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 1 ("When the telephone system was largely a network that
connected handsets like the plain old black rotary dial telephones, wiretapping
was largely a simple procedure of physically connecting a listening or moni-
toring device to a circuit associated with a telephone number. It was simple
and inexpensive.").
45. See id. at 1-2.
46. See id. at 2.
47. See id. at 42-50 (describing the problems with finding a fixed location
for cellular phones and for Personal Communication Services (PCS) phones).
48. See id. at 40.
49. See id. at 39.
1058 [Vol. 84:1051
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In total, these advanced features have made it more difficult for
law enforcement agencies to conduct electronic surveillance.50
In response to these technological developments, the
Clinton administration introduced a proposal that would even-
tually lead to CALEA.51 At the congressional hearings, the
proposal was met with both support and opposition.52 Opposi-
tion to the bill came from privacy advocate groups and the tele-
communications industry.53 The privacy advocate groups fo-
cused on the threat the bill posed to the privacy of
communications. 54 The telephone industry emphasized the
lack of need for the new legislation and the cost of the new
mandates on telephone carriers.55 The industry claimed that
the FBI was overstating any problems that it had in effectuat-
ing wiretaps.56
In support of the proposal, FBI Director Freeh spoke on
behalf of the law enforcement community. He hypothesized
that a parade of horribles would result if Congress did not act
to strengthen law enforcement's ability to conduct electronic
surveillance. 57 Freeh also indicated that the proposed bill
50. See Hearings, supra note 35, at 5-35 (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Di-
rector, Federal Bureau of Investigation). But see id. at 57, 65-78 (statement of
Roy Neel, President, U.S. Telephone Association) (stating that he "is aware of
only a handful of instances in which there has been difficulty in providing as-
sistance [to law enforcement agencies]"); id. at 70 (statement of Jerry Berg-
man, Executive Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation) (stating that "there
is no evidence that current law enforcement efforts are being jeopardized by
new technologies ... [and the] industry is cooperating with appropriate
authorities to avoid future problems and to expand existing capacities").
51. See BeVier, supra note 34, at 1069, 1075-77.
52. See H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 10-11 (1994). See generally S. REP. NO.
103-402 (1994). Since the hearings were conducted jointly the reports are al-
most identical. This Note will only cite to the House Report unless there is a
major difference between the two reports.
53. See BeVier, supra note 34, at 1077.
54. See Hearings, supra note 35, at 65-78 (statement of Jerry Bergman,
Executive Director, Electronics Frontier Foundation). Bergman also raised
cost and certainty issues. See id. at 69-70. He argued that the bill imposed
uncertain requirements on mobile telephone providers and that the cost reim-
bursement provisions were not adequate. See id. at 69.
55. See id. at 53-64 (statement of Roy Neel, President, U.S. Telephone As-
sociation).
56. See id. at 57. Speaking for the telephone industry, Roy Neel stated
that he "was not aware of a single instance in which a wire line local telephone
company has not been able to effect a lawful intercept due to complications
related to advancements in technology." Id.
57. See id. at 17-21 (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation). Specifically, Freeh provided a long list of what was to come
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would not increase the type or amount of information that law
enforcement was able to obtain.58
During the congressional debates leading up to the passage
of CALEA, Congress seemed to agree with Director Freeh, and
stated that the purpose of CALEA is "to further define the in-
dustry duty to cooperate [with law enforcement agencies] and
to establish procedures based on public accountability and in-
dustry standards-setting."59 Congress made it clear that it was
carefully balancing three key policies: "(1) to preserve a nar-
rowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry
out properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect privacy in the
face of increasingly powerful and personally revealing tech-
nologies; and (3) to avoid impeding the development of new
communications services and technologies."60
b. Provisions of CALEA
The provisions of CALEA attempt to balance the triad of
sometimes-conflicting policies that Congress identified in
passing CALEA. CALEA not only imposes new requirements
on telephone carriers, but also imposes new restrictions on the
type of information that can be obtained by law enforcement
agencies using particular methods of electronic surveillance. 61
Pursuant to its purpose, CALEA attempts to simultaneously
balance law enforcement's ability to conduct surveillance with
privacy concerns, while still allowing telephone carriers to de-
velop new communication services and technologies. 62 These
if Congress did not act. See id. at 21. He "pushed the right political buttons
with repeated references to salient terrors, invoking the World Trade Center
bombing and reminding the subcommittee of every parent's nightmare of
having a child kidnapped." BeVier, supra note 34, at 1077. Director Freeh
stressed that telephone companies have historically been uncooperative in
providing technical assistance necessary to effectuate electronic surveillance.
See Hearings, supra note 35, at 22 (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation).
58. See id. at 16. Freeh stressed that the legislation would only provide
law enforcement agencies with information that they had typically received
from electronic surveillance. See id. In many ways Freeh seemed to imply
that the legislation was just a technology update to outdated laws. See id.
59. H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 14 (1994).
60. Id. at 13.
61. See Hildegarde A. Senseney, Interpreting the Communications Assis-
tance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994: The Justice Department Versus the
Telecommunications Industry & Privacy Rights Advocates, 20 HASTINGS
ComI. & ENT. L.J. 665, 668 (1998).
62. See H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 13.
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various interests are often intertwined and difficult to separate.
This section will describe the changes that CALEA made to Ti-
tle III and ECPA by proceeding from the general changes to the
specific.
CALEA requires that wireline, cellular, and Personal
Communication Services (PCS) comply with four general capa-
bility requirements. 63 Telecommunications carriers are to be
capable of: (1) quickly obtaining, for government use, specific
communications pursuant to a court order;64 (2) quickly allow-
ing the government access to "call-identifying information that
is reasonably available;" 65 (3) delivering the intercepted com-
munications and call-identifying information to the government
over equipment provided by the carrier for the government;66
and (4) providing the previous functions without interference to
telecommunication services and preventing unauthorized inter-
ceptions. 67
Two terms in the second clause of the capability require-
ments are crucial to understanding the limits placed on law en-
forcement's ability to conduct electronic surveillance: (1) the
definition of call-identifying information; and (2) what makes
the information reasonably available. Call-identifying informa-
tion is defined as "dialing or signaling information that identi-
fies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each
communication generated or received by a subscriber by means
of any equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications
carrier."68 Based on the legislative history, it is clear that Con-
gress intended this term to be narrowly tailored. Call-
identifying information was limited to those "pulses, tones, or
messages [that] identify the numbers dialed from the facility
that is the subject of the court order or other lawful authoriza-
tion."69 Numbers dialed for other purposes, such as communi-
cating with the called party, are not considered call-identifying
information.70
Unfortunately, the statute does not define the term "rea-
sonably available" in the context of call-identifying information.
63. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1994).
64. See id. § 1002(a)(1).
65. Id. § 1002(a)(2).
66. See id. § 1003(a)(3).
67. See id. § 1003(a)(4).
68. Id. § 1001(2).
69. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 21.
70. See id.
20001 1061
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The term reasonably available limits the amount of call-
identifying information available to law enforcement agencies.
However, without a definition, the FCC and the courts are left
to interpret this vague term without any direct guidance. It is
unclear what factors the legislature was taking into account
when it attempted to limit the availability of call-identifying in-
formation. The statute does, however, provide a list of factors
including costs to be considered when determining if a capabil-
ity is "reasonably achievable."7' While not identical, this term
is similar and may be useful in providing some context for what
Congress was thinking when it used the term reasonably avail-
able.
CALEA also imposes a new limitation on the use of pen
registers by law enforcement agencies.72 The statute calls for
law enforcement agencies to use technology that was reasona-
bly available to prevent pen registers from recording numbers
other than those used in the dialing or signaling process.73
Prior to this amendment, the only factors that limited the use
of pen registers were the process used to obtain a warrant74 and
the definition of a pen register.75
71. See 47 U.S.C. § 1008(b)(1). The factors to be considered are as follows:
(A) The effect on public safety and national security.
(B) The effect on rates for basic residential telephone service.
(C) The need to protect the privacy and security of communica-
tions not authorized to be intercepted.
(D) The need to achieve the capability assistance requirements of
section 1002 of this title by cost-effective methods.
(E) The effect on the nature and cost of the equipment, facility, or
service at issue.
(F) The effect on the operation of the equipment, facility, or serv-
ice at issue.
(G) The policy of the United States to encourage the provision of
new technologies and services to the public.
(H) The financial resources of the telecommunications carrier.
(I) The effect on competition in the provision of telecommunica-
tions services.
(J) The extent to which the design and development of the equip-
ment, facility, or service was initiated before January 1, 1995.
(K) Such other factors as the Commission determines are appro-
priate.
Id.
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (1994).
73. See id.
74. See id. §§ 3121(a), 3122, 3123.
75. See id. § 3127(3) ("[T]he term 'pen register' means a device which rec-
ords or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed
or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is at-
1062 [Vol. 84:1051
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Finally, CALEA provides a safe harbor for telecommunica-
tions carriers that are "in compliance with publicly available
technical requirements or standards adopted by an industry
association or standard-setting organization, or by the Com-
mission. '76 Once the industry has set standards, the Govern-
ment or any other interested entity can petition the FCC to re-
ject the industry standards and establish new technical
requirements if the FCC finds that the industry standards are
deficient.7 7 In setting technical requirements or standards the
FCC must:
(1) meet the assistance capability requirements of [47 U.S.C. §
1002] by cost-effective methods;
(2) protect the privacy and security of communications not
authorized to be intercepted;
(3) minimize the cost of such compliance on residential ratepayers;
(4) serve the policy of the United States to encourage the provision
of new technologies and services to the public; and
(5) provide a reasonable time and conditions for compliance with
and the transition to any new standard, including defining the obliga-
tions of telecommunications carriers under [47 U.S.C. § 1002] during
any transition period? 8
So while the telecommunications industry has the first chance
to establish technical standards, the FCC is ultimately respon-
sible for determining the final standards for the safe harbor.
c. The Standard-Setting Process
In 1995, members of the Telecommunications Industry As-
sociation (TIA) began establishing industry standards that
would satisfy CALEA.79 Both telecommunications industry
members and law enforcement agencies participated in this
process.80 In the spring of 1997, proposed standards were sub-
mitted for balloting to all participants in the standard-setting
process.8' The law enforcement community unanimously op-
posed the standards and prevented their adoption.82 Further-
more, the Department of Justice and the FBI submitted a draft
tached....").
76. 47 U.S.C. § 1006(a)(2).
77. See id. § 1006(b).
78. Id.
79. See Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 1 11 (No. 97-213) (Oct. 22,
1998) [hereinafer Further NPRM].
80. See id.
81. See id. % 12.
82. See id.
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of their own technical standards to satisfy CALEA. 83 These
standards became known as the "punch list" and contained
nine items when reviewed by the FCC in the fall of 1998.84 The
punch list contained a wide variety of items,85 but for the pur-
poses of this Note only the last item is relevant.
The last item on the punch list required telecommunica-
tions carriers to provide dialed digit extraction. 86 This new ca-
pability would allow law enforcement agencies to record any
digits dialed after the call has been cut through.87 These num-
bers are known as post-cut-through numbers. In other words,
law enforcement agencies would be able to obtain additional
numbers provided to a long distance service provider, an auto-
mated system, a bank, voicemail, a paging device, or any other
numbers dialed after connection.
The industry refused to add any of the punch list items to
their standards and reballoted using a different voting method
that excluded law enforcement representatives. 88 The new
standard, J-STD-025, was announced in December of 1997.89
Between July 1997 and April 1998, several parties petitioned
for the FCC to establish standards for CALEA.90 The petitions
ranged from requests to reject J-STD-025 to requests for the
FCC to adopt J-STD-025, with some parties asking for it to be
adopted with some alterations.91 On April 20, 1998, the FCC
released a Public Notice soliciting comment on the petitions. 92
Numerous comments were filed pursuant to this request.9 3
83. See id. 13.
84. See id.
85. When submitted to Commission, the Punch List contained nine items:
(1) Content of subject-initiated conference calls; (2) Party hold, join, drop; (3)
Subject-initiated dialing and signaling information; (4) In-band and out-of-
band signaling (notification messages); (5) Timing information; (6) Surveil-
lance status; (7) Continuity check tone (c-tone); (8) Feature status; and (9) Di-
aled digit extraction. See id.
86. See id. (citations omitted).
87. See id. & n.34.
88. See id. 14.
89. See id. 15.
90. The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Depart-
ment of Justice, the FBI, and the TIA all petitioned for the Commission to es-
tablish standards for CALEA. See id. 16-22.
91. See id. 16-19.
92. See id. % 21.
93. See id.
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On November 5, 1998, the FCC released the Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (Further NPRM).94  The Further
NPRM tentatively concluded that J-STD-025 would be accept-
able if TIA modified it to include five items95 from the punch
list.96 The FCC requested further comment on whether the di-
aled digit extraction capability was necessary and tentatively
rejected the other three items97 on the punch list.98
After receiving another round of comments on the Further
NPRM, the FCC promulgated the final rules on August 26,
1999.99 In addition to the requirements of J-STD-025, these
rules ordered telecommunications carriers to provide law en-
forcement agencies with the five tentatively accepted punch list
items and dialed digit extraction. 00 The FCC considered and
rejected arguments that dialed digit extraction is not permitted
under CALEA.l0' Alternative methods of obtaining "call-
identification" information were also considered and rejected by
the FCC. 102 The FCC concluded that while it was "concerned
about the costs of a dialed digit extraction capability to origi-
nating carriers, as well as the privacy implications of permit-
ting [law enforcement agencies] to access non-call-identifying
digits (such as bank account numbers) with only a pen regis-
ter," it determined that permitting law enforcement agencies
access to post-cut-through numbers was both constitutional and
statutorily permitted.10 3
94. See id. at 1.
95. See id. 129. The following items were tentatively approved: content
of subject-initiated conference calls; party hold, join, drop on conference calls;
subject-initiated dialing and signaling information; in-band and out-of-band
signaling; and timing information. See id. 73, 85, 91, 99, 104.
96. See Third Report, supra note 3, 8.
97. See Further NPRM, supra note 79, 129. The following items were
tentatively rejected: surveillance status, continuity check tone and feature
status capabilities. See id. 109, 114, 121.
98. See Third Report, supra note 3, 8.
99. See id. at 1.
100. See id.; see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 22.1103, 24.903, 64.2203 (1999).
101. See Third Report, supra note 3, 114-23.
102. See id.
103. Id. 123.
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C. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AS APPLIED TO WIRETAPS
AND CONVENTIONAL PEN REGISTERS
As noted previously, there is a substantial difference in the
information obtained via a Title III wiretap as opposed to a pen
register.104 Due to this radical difference, the Supreme Court
has applied the Fourth Amendment to the two processes quite
differently.
1. The Constitutionality of Wiretaps
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the con-
stitutionality of wiretapping in Olmstead v. United States. 0 5
The Court held that a wiretap, conducted without obtaining a
warrant, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 0 6 The wire-
tap did not fall within the realm of a "search and seizure" as de-
fined by the Fourth Amendment because the law enforcement
agents never actually entered into a structure or searched any
tangible items. 10 7
In 1967, the Supreme Court readdressed the issue of
whether a federally conducted wiretap was constitutionally
permissible. 108 Previously, the Court had looked to determine if
the search was in a private or public area. 109 In Katz v. United
States, however, the Court framed the issue in terms of
104. See supra notes 4-21 and accompanying text.
105. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) overruled in part by Berger v. United States, 388
U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). At the time of
the decision, there were no federal statutes on the issue of wiretapping. See
id. at 465-66. The wiretap, however, was carried out in the state of Washing-
ton, where it was a misdemeanor for any person to "intercept, read or in any
manner interrupt or delay the sending of a message over any telegraph or
telephone line."' Id. at 468 (quoting Remington Compiled Statutes § 2656-18)
(1922)).
106. See id. at 464 ("The [Fourth] Amendment does not forbid what was
done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was
secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry
of the houses or offices of the defendants."). But see id. at 478 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("To protect, that right [the right to be let alone,] every unjustifi-
able intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever
the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.").
107. See id. at 464.
108. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. Katz had been convicted for violating 18
U.S.C. § 1804, which prohibited the interstate use of wire communications for
use in the business of betting or wagering. See id. at 348-49. At trial the FBI
introduced evidence which it collected by using a wiretap attached to a phone
booth that Katz frequently used. See id.
109. See id. at 351.
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whether the target had exposed information to the public."10
Katz involved a wiretap placed on a public telephone."' The
Court found that the target of the search never exposed any in-
formation to the public and instead was attempting to keep his
conversation private. 112 In a reversal of Olmstead, the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not
places."' 13 As a result, it was an invasion of privacy and an un-
constitutional "search and seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment for law enforcement officials to wiretap a
telephone booth without a warrant. 14
2. The Constitutionality of Pen Registers
Unlike wiretaps, pen registers are not subject to the
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures.115 In finding that pen registers are not subject to
Fourth Amendment protection, the Supreme Court applied a
two-part test: (1) whether the individual "exhibited an actual
subjective expectation of privacy," and (2) whether "'society is
prepared to recognize'" that expectation of privacy as reason-
able.116 The first prong is a subjective test, whereas the second
is objective. 117 With respect to the first prong, the Court held
110. See id.
111. See id. at 348-49.
112. See id at 352. The Court specifically rejected the argument that be-
cause Katz was visible after he entered the phone booth he had forfeited his
expectation of privacy. See id. Instead, the Court held that because Katz had
"shut] the door behind him, and p[aid] the toll that permits him to place a
call" he was "entitled to assume that the words he utter[ed] into the mouth-
piece [would] not be broadcast to the world." Id. In doing so, the Court im-
plied that the Fourth Amendment's protection is an evolving concept. See id.
113. Id. at 351. The Court concluded "that the underpinnings of Olmstead
and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'tres-
pass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling." Id.
at 353. Thus, the Court held that the act of listening to and recording the
telephone conversation was key to determining the constitutionality of the ac-
tivity instead of whether the police had penetrated the telephone booth during
the wiretap. See id. at 351-53.
114. See id. at 353, 359.
115. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Rakas v. Illi-
nois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7
(1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36
(1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion);
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1968)).
116. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
117. See id.
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that individuals do not generally have "any actual expectation
of privacy in the numbers they dial."118 Moreover, even if an
individual had a "subjective expectation that the phone num-
bers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not
'one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."",119
The Supreme Court concluded that there is "no legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy" in dialing information since it is turned
over to a third party, namely the phone company.120
Because pen registers are not subject to Fourth Amend-
ment protection, the constitutional requirements for obtaining
a Title III wiretap are substantially higher than those for a pen
register. In fact, the requirements for obtaining a pen register
are encompassed by those for obtaining a Title III wiretap.
This is partially due to the fact that the information received
from a pen register can be gathered via a Title III wiretap.
Given these facts, a court has held that no separate authoriza-
tion is required for a pen register when authorization for a Title
III wiretap has been obtained. 121
II. DIALED DIGIT EXTRACTION: AN UNPERMITTED AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE
The addition of dialed digit extraction to the J-STD-025
standard raises a number issues. First, it is not clear from the
text of CALEA whether Congress contemplated dialed digit ex-
traction when it passed the statute. Nor is it immediately clear
whether CALEA authorizes or prohibits the use of dialed digit
extraction; there are several statutory provisions that must be
analyzed to resolve this issue. Resolving these questions must
begin with the text of CALEA and then proceed to the legisla-
tive history and other related documents. Second, it is ques-
118. Id. at 742.
119. Id. at 743 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
120. Id. at 743-44. The Court based its conclusion on the assumption that
telephone users are aware that they are communicating the telephone num-
bers that they dial to the telephone company and that the company has the
capability to record this information and in fact does so for long distance
phone calls. See id. at 743. This may be even more true in the case of mobile
phones. Most cellular or PCS phone bills indicate the numbers that were di-
aled from the phone and some even indicate the phone numbers of incoming
calls.
121. See United States v. Kail, 612 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1979). In Kail,
government agents installed a pen register without obtaining a separate war-
rant. See id. The government agents had already obtained a warrant to con-
duct a wiretap. See id.
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tionable whether dialed digit extraction is constitutional. Be-
cause it is performed pursuant to a pen register warrant, it is
disputed whether the information obtained via dialed digit ex-
traction is protected by the Fourth Amendment or whether it is
unprotected like telephone numbers.
This Part of the Note will argue that dialed digit extraction
is not authorized by CALEA and is invalid under the Fourth
Amendment. The current statutory framework prohibits law
enforcement from obtaining post-cut-through numbers with
only a pen register warrant. This Note will provide three dis-
tinct reasons why the text of CALEA prohibits dialed digit ex-
traction. Additionally, this Note will argue that the rules per-
mitting dialed digit extraction do not conform to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, dialed digit ex-
traction is not a valid exercise of FCC authority and must be
rejected.
A. DIALED DIGIT EXTRACTION Is NOT AUTHORIZED BY CALEA
Whether CALEA authorized the use of dialed digit extrac-
tion using only a pen register depends on a three-part analysis.
First, are post-cut-through numbers "call-identification infor-
mation" as defined by CALEA? Second, are post-cut-through
numbers reasonably available? Third, will the inclusion of di-
aled digit extraction meet the requirements of 47 U.S.C.
§ 1006(b)? 122 If any of the questions are answered in the nega-
tive then dialed digit extraction must be rejected as unauthor-
ized by CALEA.
1. Post-Cut-Through Numbers Are Not "Call-Identification
Information"
Digits dialed after connection are not call-identifying in-
formation for several reasons. First, the numbers are not car-
ried on the call data channel after the initial local carrier has
connected the call123-the additional digits are carried over the
122. 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b) (1994) establishes criteria that the FCC must use
when establishing a technical standard after it has been petitioned to do so.
See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text for a more detailed description
of the requirements.
123. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text. This occurs when the
initial number (1-800-XXX-XXXX) is dialed and the individual is connected to
either the next carrier (a long distance provider), to an automated system, or
to another individual.
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call content channel.124 A pen register is not authorized to ob-
tain the content of a phone conversation. 125 Thus, by definition,
digits dialed after connection should not legally be subject to a
pen register, because a pen register warrant is not authorized
to intercept information that is carried on the call content
channel.
Second, call-identification information is limited to "dialing
or signaling information that identifies the origin, direction,
destination, or termination of each communication generated or
received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or
service of a telecommunications carrier."126 Digits dialed after
connection may serve one of two general functions. First, they
may constitute another phone number that is dialed through
another carriers' system. An example of this is a phone num-
ber placed through a long distance carrier after dialing an 800
number. Second, they may be numbers dialed to access an
automated system. Examples of this include numbers dialed to
access voice mail, bank records, a paging device and the inter-
net. For the initial local carrier the first set of numbers identi-
fies the direction, destination, and termination of the call. 127
Once the call has been cut through to the secondary services
provider 128 the primary carrier does not re-direct the call,
change its destination, or alter the call's termination point.129
The primary carrier directs the call to the secondary service
provider for the entire call. If the primary carrier provides
post-cut-through numbers, the primary carrier would be pro-
viding more than just call-identification information, because
for the primary carrier's purposes, call-identification informa-
tion is limited to the first set of numbers dialed.
Legislative history also indicates that Congress had no in-
tention of providing post-cut-through numbers to law enforce-
ment agencies via a pen register.130 Call-identifying informa-
tion was limited to the numbers dialed to signal the telephone
company where to direct the call. 131 Other numbers dialed to
124. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
126. 47 U.S.C. § 1001(2).
127. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
128. Secondary service providers include secondary carriers, such as AT&T
or Sprint, and automated systems.
129. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
130. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 21 (1994).
131. See id.
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signal automated systems are not call-identification informa-
tion. 132 Post-cut-through numbers are "other dialing tones" as
described by Congress and should be excluded from the defini-
tion of call-identifying information. Moreover, it does not mat-
ter if the recipient is a long distance provider or an automated
system; post-cut-through numbers signal the recipient and
therefore should not be considered call-identification informa-
tion.
In effect CALEA creates a binary division between call
"content" and "call-identifying information." The two terms are
mutually exclusive of one another. Physically, this division can
be seen when looking -at a common letter, the address on the
envelope is independent from the contents of the letter inside
the envelope. The same is true of a telephone communication,
except that the content comes after the directional information,
instead of inside the envelope. Call content "includes any in-
formation concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of
that communication."1 33 Since post-cut-through numbers com-
municate the "substance, purport, or meaning" of the call when
a subject dials an automated service or a paging system, they
are call content and not call-identifying information.
An additional physical example that may be quite helpful
in seeing why post-cut-through numbers are not
call-identifying information. Consider the difference between
the rules for wiretapping and pen registers in the context of the
postal service. Assume that the postal service was simultane-
ously subject to two different rules that coincide with the rule
for wiretapping and pen registers. Under the wiretap rule, a
law enforcement agency could have the postal service intercept
an entire package sent from a particular individual and have it
delivered to the law enforcement agency. Using the pen regis-
ter rule, the law enforcement agency could have the postal
service copy the address of a package and deliver this informa-
tion to the law enforcement agency. Now, assume that the law
enforcement agency had received a warrant under the pen reg-
ister rule, so that the postal service was required to inform it of
the destination of any mail sent by a particular individual. If
that individual were to send a package to a second individual,
and inside the initial package there was a pre-addressed secon-
dary package that the second individual was to send to a third
132. See id.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1994).
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party, the postal service would have no reason to know that the
contents of the package were really destined for the third party
and not the second. Furthermore, it would be unreasonable to
order the postal service to open each package and check to see
whether there was a secondary destination, especially when the
law enforcement agency could obtain the entire package under
the wiretap rule.
2. Post-Cut-Through Numbers Are Not Reasonably Available
Law enforcement agencies are not authorized by CALEA to
require telephone carriers to provide all call-identification in-
formation regardless of the availability of the information.' 34
Telephone carriers are only required to isolate call-
identification information if it is "reasonably available" to the
carrier.1 35 Because of the way in which telecommunications
systems are currently set-up and the way they will be set-up in
the near future, post-cut-through numbers are not "reasonably
available" to the initial carrier.
Although there is no definition of "reasonably available"
provided by the Code, 136 the definition of "reasonably achiev-
able"137 sheds some light on what Congress may have intended.
A majority of the elements to be considered when determining
whether an item is "reasonably achievable" relate to the cost of
the item. 138 Although no firm figures are available, most ob-
servers believe that adding the dialed digit extraction feature
will be very expensive for telecommunications carriers. 139
In order to isolate the post-cut-through numbers dialed
during a particular telephone call, telecommunications carriers
would have to radically alter their existing switching systems
resulting in additional costs. 140 Currently, switches detect
numbers with a tone receiver, 141 a device that is built into the
switch. However, there are not as many tone receivers as
134. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (1994).
135. Id.
136. 47 U.S.C. § 1008(b)(1).
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. See John H. Harwood, Comments of U.S. West, Inc. at 9 (No. 97-213)
(May 20, 1998). Total costs estimates range into the billions of dollars. See id.
140. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text (describing switching
systems).
141. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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channels for simultaneous calls going through the switch. 142
The switches are built in this manner so that once a call is cut-
through, the tone receiver used on the first call can be made
available for use on another call. 143 Under the new standards,
telecommunication carriers would have to install additional
tone receivers on all of their switches because in order to effec-
tuate dialed digit extraction the tone receivers would need to be
operational during the entire call, not just during the routing of
the call."' 4 Current switches do not have enough tone receivers
to allow them to be connected for an entire call without causing
disruption to the system. 145
In order to understand how telecommunication switches
operate, consider an art museum that limits the number of visi-
tors that can be in the museum at the same time. The limited
number of people allowed in the museum is analogous to the
number of channels in the switch. Instead of tone receivers di-
recting the calls, the museum has employees direct visitors to
their desired exhibit at each door to the museum. Instead of
connecting a tone receiver to a call for its entirety, assume em-
ployees were instructed to follow certain visitors during their
entire visit in case the visitor decided to go to another exhibit
and needed directions. In order to ensure that when an em-
ployee left her door to follow a visitor there was another em-
ployee to direct visitors at the door, the museum would need
more employees. In the same way, telecommunications compa-
nies will be forced to install extra tone receivers if they are
forced to monitor calls for post-cut-through numbers with a pen
register, because currently there are not enough tone receivers
to monitor calls for their entirety but only until they are cut-
through. Although closing the door may be an option for the
museum, closing a switch is not an option for the telephone in-
dustry; if they decide not to install additional tone receivers
into their switches, telephone calls would simply go uncon-
nected.
Therefore to comply with the dialed digit extraction re-
quirements, telecommunications carries would need to under-
take a massive upgrade of their existing switching system to
142. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. For example assume that a
switch could connect 50 different calls through it at any given time. That
switch may only have 5 to 10 tone receivers.
143. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
144. See May TIA Petition, supra note 16, at 44-45.
145. See id.
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include the additional tone receivers. The cost of such an up-
grade is estimated to range in the billions of dollars. Over
20,000 switches of differing ages, some dating back to the early
1900s, will need to be modified to have extra tone receivers in-
stalled. 146 Adding further to the cost, each modification will be
different as older switches operate much differently than mod-
em switches.147 Furthermore, the installation of these capabili-
ties into network switches will most likely occur outside of the
normal upgrade cycle148 and installing these capabilities out-of-
cycle will greatly increase the cost because extra personnel will
need to be hired as current personnel will continue to be modi-
fying switches on their normal upgrade cycle.149
In addition to a lack of tone receivers, further advances in
technology will make it even more difficult to detect post-cut-
through numbers. For instance, voice-recognition dialing al-
lows an individual to speak the name of the person whom she is
calling instead of dialing the numbers. 150 In order for the ini-
tial local carrier to determine if an individual had used such a
feature after being connected, the local carrier would need to
"directly integrate its network intercept facilities with the
equipment or databases of the second carrier, or possibly to in-
stall voice-recognition hardware and software in its own
switches." 151 In addition, all of the systems would need to be
standardized so that they operated in the same way.152 Inte-
grating these systems would be prohibitively expensive. 153
The definition of reasonably achievable also takes into con-
sideration the "privacy and security of communications not
authorized to be intercepted"154 and the "policy of the United
States to encourage the provision of new technologies and
146. See ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 41, at 38.
147. See id.
148. See Eric W. DeSilva et. al., Comments of the Personal Communica-
tions Indus. Assoc. at 12 (No. 97-213) (Dec. 14, 1998) [hereinafter December
PCIA Petition]. On a periodic basis telephone carriers update the technology
in all of their switches. See id. Upgrades are made when it is no more expen-
sive to upgrade the switch than to continue using it. See id. By mandating
that all switches be modified to meet the new rules, the FCC is forcing tele-
phone carriers to modify their switches when it is more efficient to continue to
operate them. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 45.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. 47 U.S.C. § 1008(b)(1)(C) (1994).
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services to the public."155 Dialed digit extraction runs counter
to both of these goals. First, by providing law enforcement
agencies with post-cut-through numbers, dialed digit extraction
is giving them information that they are not authorized to ob-
tain.156 Secondly, these capabilities hamper the development of
new technologies by diverting resources that could be used for
research and development, or installation of new technology to
pay for the installation of additional tone receivers, which will
provide no additional services to consumers.
3. The Inclusion of Dialed Digit Extraction Violates the
Requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b)
In addition to the issues raised above, the FCC is specifi-
cally prohibited from including dialed digit extraction in the
technical standard. 57 Section 1006(b) of Title 47 establishes a
framework for the FCC to set the technical standards for
CALEA. 58 Requiring dialed digit extraction is contrary to this
framework because of the costs it will entail and the potential
loss of privacy it poses to the public.
Minimizing costs is central to several of the framework's
guidelines. 159 The first and third guidelines specifically refer to
minimizing costs, while the fourth guideline directs the FCC to
issue technical standards that encourage new technologies and
services. 160 As discussed earlier, dialed digit extraction will be
very expensive, 161 and these costs will be passed along to con-
sumers.1 62 There are several reasons for the high costs for im-
plementation. First, not only will existing technologies need to
be redesigned to comply with the new standards, but new
155. Id. § 1008(b)(1)(G).
156. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
157. See 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b).
158. See id.
159. See id. § 1006(b)(1)-(5).
160. See id. § 1006(b)(1), (3).
161. See supra notes 139-40, 148-53 and accompanying text.
162. See December PCIA Petition, supra note 148, at 12. Congress initially
allocated $500 million dollars to subsidize telecommunications companies. See
Barbara J. Kern, Ameritech's Comments on the Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to establish Technical Requirements and Standards for CALEA
at 4 (No. 97-213) (Dec. 24, 1998) [hereinafter Ameritech Petition]. This figure
falls drastically short of the over $2 billion that it will cost just to implement
the J-STD-025 standards. See December PCIA Petition, supra note 148, at 11.
The cost difference will be passed along to consumers in the form of higher
rates. See id. at 12.
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emerging technology will also need to be redesigned.1 63 Redes-
igning technology just before it is introduced will drive up the
cost of technology and delay implementation. 64 Second, the
short period of time to accomplish compliance will also present
problems because telecommunications companies will be
strapped to find qualified individuals to perform the necessary
work to make their systems CALEA-compliant while at the
same time ensuring system reliability. 6 5 Telecommunications
companies will be forced to hire more personnel and spend ad-
ditional resources on training new personnel to implement the
new standards. 166 All of these expenses will effect whether or
not telecommunications companies are able to offer new serv-
ices and technologies because increasing the cost of providing
new services decreases the likelihood that they will become
available. 67
In addition, dialed digit extraction does not "protect the
privacy and security of communications not authorized to be in-
tercepted" and thus violates the second guideline. 6 8 While
some of the post-cut-through numbers are secondary phone
numbers, other post-cut-through numbers access automated
systems and are not authorized to be intercepted. 169 Telecom-
munications carriers are not able to differentiate between the
different types of post-cut-through numbers. 170 Dialed digit ex-
traction will therefore provide law enforcement agencies with
post-cut-through numbers that represent responses to auto-
mated systems. Since law enforcement agencies are only
authorized to obtain phone numbers when they have a pen
register warrant,171 they will be violating the privacy of com-
munications they do not have the authority to intercept.
163. See May TIA Petition, supra note 16, at 44-45.
164. See id.
165. See December PCIA Petition, supra note 148, at 12.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 14-15.
168. 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b)(2) (1994).
169. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
170. See Ameritech Petition, supra note 162, at 11.
171. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
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B. DIALED DIGIT EXTRACTION VIOLATES THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
While the Supreme Court has held that the unauthorized
use of a Title III wiretap violates the Fourth Amendment, 172
there is no Fourth Amendment violation for unauthorized use
of a pen register.173 However, the expansion of a pen register to
include dialed digit extraction alters this analysis because it
expands the type and amount of information that a pen register
obtains. 174 Pen registers with dialed digit extraction capabili-
ties should receive the same treatment as Title III wiretaps do
under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court has previously held that the Fourth Amendment
applies when there is a 'qegitimate expectation of privacy."175
Determining if there is a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in-
volves a two prong test: the first prong looks at the subjective
expectation of the individual targeted for electronic surveil-
lance. The second prong looks at whether or not society recog-
nizes that individual's subjective expectation of privacy. 76 Ob-
taining post-cut-through numbers with a pen register violates
both prongs of the test. While individuals may not have a sub-
jective expectation of privacy in the numbers that they dial,
they most likely do have such an expectation when it comes to
content transmitted over the telephone line in the form of post-
cut-through digits. There is no functional difference, in terms
of expectations, between an individual who calls a bank and
speaks to an actual banker to get his balance or an individual
who calls a bank and uses an automated system to get his bal-
ance. Either way, the individuals are transmitting information
over the telephone wire that they do not wish to expose to the
public. 77 The type of information typically transmitted over
the telephone by use of post-cut-through numbers is incredibly
far-reaching: bank account numbers and codes, prescription
172. See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. The first prong looks at
the subjective expectation of privacy of the individual subject to the pen regis-
ter. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). The second prong com-
pares that subjective expectation of privacy against what society is ready to
recognize as reasonable. See id.
177. See Third Report, supra note 3, 123. A typical individual would not
freely disclose this type of information.
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identification numbers, paging messages, social security num-
bers, driver license numbers, airline flight information, credit
card numbers, voicemail passwords, general account pass-
words, and responses to automated systems. In Smith v. Mary-
land, the Court noted that individuals know or should know
that the numbers dialed to connect a call are made into a per-
manent record. 178 Accordingly, an individual has no expecta-
tion of privacy in the numbers dialed. 179 However, post-cut-
through numbers present a different issue. These numbers do
not appear on the monthly bill, nor are they documented on a
permanent record. Thus, while individuals may knowingly ex-
pose the telephone numbers they dial to make telephone call,
they may still wish to keep information communicated via post-
cut-through numbers private, a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy that warrants Fourth Amendment protection.
Furthermore, the subjective expectation of privacy is one
that society recognizes as reasonable. In the past, information
carried in post-cut-through numbers was transmitted via voice
communications over telephone systems. For instance, the in-
formation now dialed into a telephone to transfer money from
one bank account to another used to be done by talking to a
banker instead of using an automated system. The different
method of communication does not change the type of informa-
tion that is transmitted, nor should it change the type of pro-
tection that it receives. 180 This information has generally been
viewed as protected by the Fourth Amendment 81 and should
continue to be so protected.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO DIALED DIGIT EXTRACTION
THAT DO NOT POSE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OR
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
There are three alternatives that have been proposed by
the telecommunications industry to meet the demands of the
law enforcement community. Two of these alternatives provide
law enforcement agencies with post-cut-through numbers di-
aled through a secondary provider without reaching beyond
178. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. The Court noted that individuals see a
list of all long distance numbers that they have dialed on their monthly phone
bill. See id. With mobile telephones, most users see a listing of all numbers
that they dial on their bill.
179. See id. at 742-43.
180. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
181. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1967).
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CALEA or violating the Fourth Amendment. The third alter-
native reduces the cost of compliance for telecommunication
companies, but presents significant constitutional problems.
First, law enforcement agencies could obtain a Title III
wiretap when they are concerned about the possibility of the
subject dialing through an 800 number. Obtaining a Title III
wiretap would allow law enforcement agencies to record the en-
tire conversation, including post-cut-through numbers. With
this information, the law enforcement agency will be able to de-
cipher the post-cut-through numbers and identify the final
telephone number that was dialed.
Law enforcement agencies may argue that this alternative
will eliminate their ability to conduct pen register wiretaps.
Because the requirements for obtaining a Title III wiretap are
substantially higher than those to secure a pen register war-
rant,182 this alternative prohibits law enforcement agencies
from obtaining post-cut-through numbers in instances where
the law enforcement agency has enough information to obtain a
pen register but not enough to obtain a Title III wiretap. Al-
though these concerns may be relevant, they overlook the fact
that the current rules ignore the statutory language of CALEA
and invade the privacy of individuals. 18 3 Law enforcement
agencies should not be making policy decisions because Con-
gress has already defined the limits of what law enforcement
agencies are allowed to do in terms of conducting wiretaps and
pen registers. 8 4
Second, law enforcement agencies could serve long distance
800 carriers with pen register warrants in addition to the ini-
tial carrier. The post-cut-through numbers for the initial car-
rier are call-identifying numbers for the long distance car-
rier.185 Those numbers inform the long distance carrier how to
direct the call. 86 By obtaining a pen register warrant and
serving it upon both the initial local carrier and the long dis-
tance carrier, the law enforcement agency would be informed of
the final number dialed and the path that the subject took to
dial that number. This seems to be exactly what Congress had
in mind when it passed CALEA since the legislative history in-
182. See supra Part I.C.
183. See supra Part II.
184. See supra Part I.B.
185. See supra Part II.A.1.
186. See supra Part II.A.1.
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dicates that CALEA was not intended to provide "one-stop
shopping."187
Law enforcement agencies may argue that this alternative
allows criminals to defeat pen registers by frequently changing
the 800 number that they use. This problem could be dealt
with in one of two ways. First, long distance providers could be
required to keep records of all calls made through their system
for a certain period of time. Law enforcement agencies could
then subpoena those records when a call was made through
that provider. Alternatively, long distance providers could be
required to participate in a national network that would gather
information from each provider to be made available to law en-
forcement agencies. With this method, law enforcement would
only have to serve two warrants, one on the initial local carrier
and one on the national network.
A third alternative is to provide law enforcement agencies
with the content of all calls when the law enforcement agency
has obtained a pen register warrant. The law enforcement
agency would then be required to install the necessary equip-
ment to extract the post-cut-through numbers. This would
avoid the need to install extra tone receivers in the telecommu-
nications switches and avoid the expense of developing the di-
aled digit extraction feature. The device used by law enforce-
ment would be similar to a device currently used to decipher
what number have been dialed from the different tones.
However, while this alternative shifts the cost of extracting
the post-cut-through numbers from the telecommunications
companies to law enforcement agencies and reduces the cost by
eliminating the need to install extra tone receives, 188 it still re-
quires delivery of the content of telephone calls to law enforce-
ment agencies without a Title III wiretap warrant. This would
have constitutional implications because law enforcement
agencies would be conducting a "search and seizure" without
meeting the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Law en-
forcement agencies would have the responsibility to make sure
that no one accessed the content of the conversation. They
alone would be responsible for limiting their use of the informa-
tion and not accessing the information contained in the post-
cut-through numbers. Given the fact that law enforcement
187. H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 23 (1994) ("The bill is not intended to guar-
antee 'one-stop shopping' for law enforcement.").
188. See Ameritch Petition, supra note 162, at 12-13.
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agencies would possess post-cut-through numbers that repre-
sent content and the probability that they would be tempted to
access this content, this alternative would potentially create
more problems than solutions.
CONCLUSION
As argued by this Note, the inclusion of dialed digit extrac-
tion should be invalidated for a number of reasons. Dialed digit
extraction violates three specific provision of CALEA. Post-cut-
through numbers are not call-identifying information nor are
they reasonably available to the initial carrier. Additionally,
including dialed digit extraction breaches the framework es-
tablished for technical standards in 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b). Re-
quiring telecommunication carriers to provide law enforcement
agencies with dialed digit extraction overreaches the authority
that Congress gave to the FCC in CALEA.
In addition to its statutory problems, the inclusion of di-
aled digit extraction poses substantial constitutional issues.
The Supreme Court's previous decisions on the constitutional-
ity of pen registers are no longer applicable because those deci-
sions assumed that pen registers did not have the capability to
record post-cut-through numbers. Pen registers are now capa-
ble of obtaining the type of information that was traditionally
protected by the Fourth Amendment. However, because pen
register warrants can be issued without meeting the strict re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment, the inclusion of dialed
digit extraction as a part of a pen register warrant is unconsti-
tutional.
Although the needs of the law enforcement community
should be considered when developing the standards under
CALEA, those needs should not be given priority over other
concerns. Alternatives such as obtaining a Title III wiretap or
serving pen register warrants on secondary carriers will pro-
vide law enforcement agencies with the information that they
need within the statute and without violating the Constitution.
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